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SOME THOUGHTS ON AN AGENDA FOR THE
PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING
OVERSIGHT BOARD
ELLIOTT J. WEISS†

INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) 1 was
enacted in response to widespread concern that there is “a
serious problem in financial reporting and disclosure” and that
“Enron and like cases are aberrational only in size and
severity.” 2 The Act includes provisions regulating corporate
3
4
boards of directors, corporate audit committees, transactions
5
between corporations and their executives, the obligations of
attorneys who represent public corporations in securities

Copyright © 2003 by Elliott J. Weiss.
† Charles E. Ares Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona. An
earlier version of this paper was presented at an October 2002 conference at Villanova Law
School on Enron and its aftermath. Participants at that conference, at a faculty workshop at the
James E. Rogers College of Law, and at the ILEP conference, as well as colleagues on the
accounting faculty of the University of Arizona and Larry Cunningham all provided helpful
comments. This Article was largely completed in July 2003 and further revised in September
2003. To a very limited extent, it has been updated to reflect related legal developments. All
errors are mine.
1. Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and
29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2003)).
2. Donald Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection: The SEC
and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1151 (2003).
3. The regulations imposed are both direct and indirect. See section 406 of SarbanesOxley (15 U.S.C.A. § 7264) (illustrating indirect regulation through required disclosure of the
company’s code of ethics for senior financial officers); see also sections 303 (15 U.S.C.A. § 7242)
(regulating conduct of directors relating to an audit of financial statements), 304 (15 U.S.C.A. §
7243) (requiring forfeiture of bonuses or profits obtained due to misstated financial reports),
and 306 (15 U.S.C.A. § 7244) (prohibiting trading during pension fund blackout periods).
4. See section 301 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j–1(m)) (listing the standards and requirements
applicable to public company audit committees).
5. See section 402 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78(m)) (prohibiting corporate loans to executives).
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6
matters, and the compensation and autonomy of securities
7
analysts. At the heart of the Act, though, are the provisions that
authorize the creation of a new regulatory body, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board), require
all accounting firms that audit the books of public corporations to
register with the Board, and grant the Board broad authority to
regulate those firms and their associated professionals.8
Sarbanes-Oxley directs the PCAOB to take such actions as it
deems “necessary or appropriate to promote high professional
standards among, and improve the quality of audit services offered
by, registered public accounting firms and associated persons . . . in
9
order to protect investors, or to further the public interest.” The
Board’s mission quite clearly is to develop regulations and implement
regulatory procedures that will bolster—and may even restore—the
public’s confidence in the integrity of public accounting firms and the
credibility of the financial reports they audit and certify.10
Public confidence in the integrity of public companies’
financial reports has been shaken by numerous, highly publicized
11
instances of financial fraud at companies as prominent as

6. See section 307 (15 U.S.C.A. § 7245) (charging the SEC with the task of establishing
rules of professional responsibility for attorneys practicing before the Commission).
7. See section 501 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78o–6) (requiring the Commission to set rules
addressing conflicts of interest that can arise “when security analysts recommend equity
securities in research reports and public appearances”).
8. See sections 101 (15 U.S.C.A. § 7211) (establishing the Board), 102 (15 U.S.C.A. §
7212) (requiring registration with the Board), 103 (15 U.S.C.A. § 7213) (granting the Board
authority to set auditing, quality control, and independence standards).
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(c)(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(c)(5).
10. One study found that audit firms “gave a clean bill of health to 93.9% of public
companies that were subsequently involved in accounting problems.” Martin D. Weiss, The
Worsening Crisis of Confidence on Wall Street: The Role of Auditing Firms, at http://www.
weissratings.com/worsening-crisis.pdf (July 5, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
11. See Deborah Solomon, Fraud Detector: SEC Sets a New Rule, WALL ST. J., May 28,
2003, at C1 (noting that the SEC’s recent rulemaking efforts are designed to prevent frauds,
such as those at Enron and HealthSouth, which undercut investor confidence); David Wessel,
Capital: Jitters over War with Iraq May Not be the Only Factor Weighing on the Economy, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 20, 2003, at A2 (stating that financial scandals hurt not only public confidence in
business but also attitudes of investors, bankers, corporate directors, and executives toward
each other); Robert J. Shiller, Celebrity CEOs Share the Blame for Street Scandals, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 2002, at A20 (noting that scandals like Rite-Aid and WorldCom have the potential to
upset investor confidence by changing fundamental beliefs about management’s ability to
promote long-term earnings growth over short-term share price increases).
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12
13
14
15
Enron, Rite-Aid, WorldCom, and HealthSouth, and by the
failure of auditors to detect that those companies had been “cooking
16
their books” for many years. There is no doubt that one prominent
item on the PCAOB’s substantive agenda will be figuring out how to
encourage or require auditors to detect such frauds.
This Article, however, does not focus on the ways in which the
PCAOB should deal with fraud-related issues. Rather, it is directed at
two more pervasive problems that also have sapped the public’s
confidence in the integrity of corporations’ financial reports:

•

Earnings management, by which I mean the tendency of many
corporate managers to make the numerous accounting
judgments that generally accepted accounting principles
17
(GAAP) permit or require not in good faith, but with a view to
reporting some desired level of corporate income (or some
18
other desired figure in their company’s financial statements).

12. See Markets, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003 at C4 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley was passed
“after the Enron and WorldCom scandals eroded confidence in Wall Street”); see also Andrew
Parker, Firms Await Audit Crackdown—Regulator to Unveil Tough Rules on Fees and
Additional Work for Clients, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at 1 (“US business scandals such
as Enron and WorldCom undermined confidence in companies’ accounts partly because of
allegations of poor work by auditors.”).
13. See Scott Kilman, Rite Aid Ex-Officials Charged in Accounting Fraud Probe, WALL ST.
J., June 24, 2002, at A2 (describing the scheme that resulted in what was then the largest U.S.
corporate earnings restatement to date (approximately $258 million)).
14. See Jared Sandberg & Deborah Solomon, WorldCom Board to Begin Search for New
CEO, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, at A3 (describing the market downturn that resulted from the
discovery of WorldCom’s $3.8 billion financial overstatement, later to total more than $7
billion).
15. See Carrick Mollenkamp & Chad Terhune, HealthSouth Puts False Accounting at $2.5
Billion, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2003, at A3 (reporting the results of the auditor’s cumulative
investigation—$2.5 billion in fraudulent or improper accounting designed to manipulate
earnings and meet Wall Street expectations).
16. See Jerry Useem, In Corporate America It’s Cleanup Time, FORTUNE, Sept. 16, 2002, at
62 (noting that companies who meet analyst estimates exactly or beat them by a penny face a
presumption that they have been cooking their books); Carol J. Loomis, Lies, Damned Lies, and
Managed Earnings, FORTUNE, Aug. 2, 1999 at 74 (equating the term “cooking the books” with
criminal accounting fraud).
17. GAAP are the principles that govern how financial information is to be presented in
financial statements. They are set forth in Statements of Financial Accounting Standards
(SFAS) promulgated by the Financial Standards Accounting Board (FASB), as well as by
similar standards promulgated by predecessors to the FASB that have not been superceded by
SFAS, and by authoritative statements in the accounting literature that address issues not
addressed by such standards. DONALD E. KEISO & JERRY J. WEIGANDT, INTERMEDIATE
ACCOUNTING, 6, 13–14 (9th ed. 1998).
18. Patricia M. Dechow & Douglas J. Skinner, Earnings Management: Reconciling the
Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 235, 238
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The failure of public companies and their accountants to make
clear to the public the extent to which critical entries in those
companies’ financial statements are based on highly subjective
judgments, the accuracy of which cannot be measured
objectively. Inevitably, with the passage of time, some of those
judgments prove inaccurate. Even if those judgments were made
in good faith, investors who do not appreciate the amount of
subjectivity involved in preparing financial statements may
suspect that the disparity between what was reported and
“economic reality” is a product of earnings management, if not
of outright fraud.

Professor Don Langevoort argues that the best way to address
these problems is for the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) again to overhaul its approach to Management’s Discussion
19
and Analysis (the MD&A). I disagree. The SEC has been pushing
that particular string with little success for many years now,20 which
leads me to question whether any new approach the SEC is likely to
adopt will be much more successful in eliciting meaningful, forward
(2000). Professors Dechow and Skinner point out that it is difficult to measure “earnings
management” because it turns on managers’ subjective intent, which cannot be observed
directly. Id.
19. Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1155. The SEC requires every public company to include
an MD&A in its annual reports on Form 10-K and its quarterly reports on Form 10-Q.
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2003) (commonly known as Regulation S-K, Instruction 3,
Item 303). According to the SEC, the purpose of the MD&A is to provide (i) a narrative
explanation of the company’s financial statements that enable investors to see the company
through the eyes of management; (ii) a context within which the company’s financial statements
should be analyzed; and (iii) information about the quality of, and potential variability of, the
company’s earnings and cash flow, so that investors can better assess the company’s likely future
performance. Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711,
52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,717 (Apr. 24, 1987).
20. For those unfamiliar with this expression, it refers to the fact that a string can be pulled
but cannot be pushed. Recent evidence of the SEC’s lack of success is provided by a report from
the Division of Corporation Finance, which reviewed the annual reports for 2001 filed by all
Fortune 500 companies and noted significant deficiencies in 350 of them. U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Summary by the Division of Corporation Finance of Significant Issues Addressed in
the Review of the Periodic Reports of Fortune 500 Companies, at http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm (last modified Feb. 27, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). The Division noted that although the SEC had indicated in FR-60 that companies
should provide more information in their MD&A about their critical accounting policies, “a
substantial number of companies did not provide any critical accounting policy disclosure[;] . . .
the critical accounting policy disclosures of many companies did not adequately respond to the
guidance provided in FR-60 [and] many companies failed to provide the sensitivity analysis the
Commission encouraged in FR-60.” Id. (emphasis added.). In 2001 10-K reporting, the SEC
identified little quantified sensitivity analysis. Linda C. Quinn & Ottilie L. Jarmel, MD&A 2003:
Linchpin of SEC Post-Enron Disclosure Reform, 1395 PLI/Corp 487, 495 (Nov. 2003).
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looking disclosures from corporate managers than have the SEC’s
past, failed efforts.
A major conceptual problem with the SEC’s approach, in my
view, is that the Commission has persisted in treating “historical”
financial information as if it is fixed in nature, rather than inherently
uncertain. Thus, in its guidance concerning preparation of the
MD&A, the SEC advises issuers to focus “on material events and
uncertainties known to management that would cause reported
financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future
21
operating results or future financial conditions.” The SEC ignores—
or treats as nonexistent—the possibility that as a consequence of
“material [future] events and uncertainties,” reported financial results
will prove not to reflect accurately past operating results or past
financial conditions. Yet, as every sophisticated user of financial
reports knows, this almost always is a distinct possibility.22
The SEC has a tradition of viewing historical information as
23
fixed and certain—so long as it is not tainted by fraud. The PCAOB
is not bound by this tradition and thus is well positioned both to limit
earnings management and to help investors better appreciate the
uncertainties inherent in all financial statements, including those
prepared in good faith. If the Board does so, investors will have
greater confidence in the integrity of public companies’ financial

21. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
22. To illustrate, when a company that sells on credit establishes an allowance for doubtful
accounts receivable, it must make assumptions about whether those customers who now owe it
money are more likely, less likely, or as likely to pay their bills as the customers to whom the
company has sold its products in prior periods, as well as whether a significant shift in overall
economic conditions or conditions within a particular industry or locale are likely to lead to
substantial changes in its customers’ bill-paying habits. Even assumptions made in good faith
may prove to be wrong. If they are, the company’s real economic results and financial position
may vary considerably from the results and financial position it reported in its filing with the
SEC.
23. See Paul H. Dawes et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and SEC Rulemaking, 1378
PLI/Corp 245, 256 (2003) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley’s encouragement of qualitative
information disclosures could result in “a reappraisal of the Commission’s traditional emphasis
on historical information as the basis on which investment decisions are made,” but whether this
will be more effective against fraud “remains to be seen”); Jeanne Calderon & Rachel Kowal,
Safe Harbors: Historical and Current Approaches to Future Forecasting, 22 J. CORP. L. 661, 662
(1997) (describing the Commission’s preference for historical (“hard”) information in company
disclosures); Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 254, 258 (1972) (“The Commission tries to confine [SEC filings] to hard information to
assure a continued high degree of reliability. . . [which also] makes it easier to establish
accountability for inadequate disclosures.”).
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statements and should be better able to appreciate the risks involved
in buying and selling the securities those companies have issued.
Although the PCAOB lacks the authority to prescribe or amend
GAAP, this should not impair its ability to achieve these goals if the
Board makes creative use of its authority (i) to establish and amend
24
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), (ii) to inspect the
operations of public accounting firms, and (iii) to discipline those
firms and their associated personnel where they do not follow the
auditing standards the Board has prescribed. More specifically, the
PCAOB should be able to decrease earnings management and
increase investors’ understanding of public companies’ financial
statements by embarking on a three-part program that includes the
following:25
•

Independence: The PCAOB should seek to ensure that public
accountants approach audit assignments at public companies as
independent professionals committed to ensuring that the
financial statements they audit and certify reflect economic
reality as closely as reasonably possible.

•

Accuracy: The PCAOB should amend GAAS to require
auditors to be more sensitive to the possibility of “earnings
management” and, where circumstances suggest earnings
management is likely, to scrutinize closely all important
judgments and assumptions that GAAP permit or require
managers to make.

24. GAAS are the principles that govern the procedures an accountant should use to verify
the accuracy of the information in a financial statement it is auditing. Prior to the creation of the
PCAOB, GAAS were promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), the professional organization to which most certified public accountants belong.
GAAS issued by the AICPA can be found in the Codification of Statements on Auditing
Standards (AICPA 2002).
25. The Board, of course, also must address a number of major organizational and
administrative issues, especially during the early years of its existence. These include staffing a
major new regulatory organization from the ground up and developing policies and procedures
to govern that organization’s operations. The Board also must issue regulations to implement a
number of specific legislative mandates. For example, section 103(a)(1) of Sarbanes-Oxley
requires the Board to establish auditing and related attestation standards, quality control
standards, and ethics standards to be used by registered public accounting firms in the
preparation and issuance of audit reports. The Board is also granted the power to establish rules
to implement the auditor independence requirements in Title II of the Act. PCAOB Rel. No.
2003–009, Compliance with Auditing and Related Professional Practice Standards: Advisory
Groups, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 004 (June 30, 2003). As evidenced by the
Board’s website, which lists all of its regulatory initiatives, that process seems to be well under
way. See http://www.pcaob.com (last visited Jan. 26, 2003).

WEISS.DOC

2003]
•

06/21/04 4:04 PM

PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING

497

Transparency: The PCAOB should also endeavor to ensure that
investors better understand the inherent subjectivity of public
companies’ financial statements by requiring auditors to explain
why they believe a public company’s financial statements
present fairly, in conformity with GAAP, the results of its
26
operations and its financial position.

As explained below, to achieve these objectives the PCAOB will
need to think outside the box and promulgate auditing and ethical
standards that address the very issues the accounting profession
27
traditionally has chosen not to address. In addition, the Board will
need to use its authority to review the performance of registered
public auditing firms and to discipline firms and auditors in order to
promote a high level of compliance with whatever new standards it
chooses to promulgate.
I. INDEPENDENCE
One major concern that led to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley
was that, as accounting firms began to derive an increasing portion
of their revenues from nonaudit services, they faced increasing
28
conflicts of interest. Title II of Sarbanes-Oxley addresses the issue
of auditor independence, which, according to the relevant Senate
29
report, “is at the center of this legislation.” Title II includes a

26. This is the key language in the opinions public accountants now issue with respect to
the financial statements of public companies they have audited. See Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 58, Reports on Audited Financial Statements
(1988) (as amended).
27. Observers have pointed out that the auditing standards promulgated by the AICPA,
which had authority to promulgate such standards prior to the creation of the PCAOB, were
written largely with a view to protecting auditing firms from possible liability for faulty audits.
See, e.g., Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public
Companies: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th
Cong. 6 (2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant,
Securities and Exchange Commission) (“Simply put, auditing standards today, which are often
reviewed and edited by the legal counsels of the [major public accounting] firms, are written to
protect the interests of the firms, not ensure quality audits that will protect investors.”).
PCAOB has taken the critical first step of deciding to strip the AICPA of its authority to set
auditing standards for registered public accounting firms. The Board has asserted that it alone
will have the authority to establish such standards and to amend existing standards. Statement
Regarding the Establishment of Auditing and Other Professional Standards, PCAOB Release
No. 2003–005, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,667 (Apr. 18, 2003).
28. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 201–209, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j–1 (West Supp. 2003).
29. S. REP. NO. 107–205, at 14 (2002).
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number of explicit prohibitions and requirements directed at
promoting auditors’ independence.
Section 201, the most important of these provisions, makes it
unlawful for accounting firms to provide audit clients with any of
eight categories of nonaudit services that Congress determined create
30
“a fundamental conflict of interest for the accounting firms.” Section
201 also authorizes the Board to designate additional nonaudit
services that accounting firms would then be prohibited from
providing to audit clients.31 Further, section 201 stipulates that before
an accounting firm can provide an audit client with any nonaudit
services, including tax services, that activity must be “approved in
advance by the audit committee of the issuer.”32
Several other Title II provisions promote auditor independence.
Section 203 requires accounting firms to change the lead and
33
reviewing partners assigned to an audit client every five years.
Section 207 directs the Comptroller General to conduct a study of
“the potential effects of requiring the mandatory rotation of
registered public accounting firms” and report the results to
Congress.34 To deal with the conflicts of interest inherent in the
“revolving door” situation—in which a partner or employee of an
accounting firm that has audited a client company becomes a senior
executive or financial officer of that company—section 206 imposes a
one-year “cooling off period” during which it is unlawful for an
accounting firm to audit a company that is so employing one of its
former partners or employees.35
Finally, Title II seeks to further bolster accounting firms’ and
audit committees’ independence by strengthening their relationship
with each other. Section 202 makes public companies’ audit
committees responsible for preapproving all audit (and nonaudit)
36
services provided by their auditors. Section 204 directs every
registered public accounting firm to report in a timely fashion to the
audit committee of every public audit client (1) the client company’s
30. Id. at 18; see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j–1(g).
31. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j–1(g)(9).
32. Id. § 201(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j–1(h) (adding section 10A(h) to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et seq.). Section 201(b) grants the PCAOB authority to exempt
issuers and firms from these prohibitions on a case-by-case basis. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j–1(m)(3)(c).
33. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j–1(j) (adding section 10A(j) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
34. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7232.
35. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j–1(c) (adding section 10A(l) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
36. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j–1(i).

WEISS.DOC

2003]

06/21/04 4:04 PM

PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING

499

“critical accounting policies and practices”; (2) “all alternative
treatments of financial information” it has discussed with the
management of that company, the ramifications of alternative
disclosures and accounting treatments, and the treatment the
accounting firm prefers; and (3) all other “material written
communications” between the accounting firm and the management
37
of the issuer.
Given the range of statutory prohibitions and requirements
directed at promoting auditors’ independence, one might well ask
whether it is necessary for the PCAOB to take additional action in
this area. My answer is yes. Several years ago, Judge Frank
Easterbrook argued that it would be “irrational” for a large public
accounting firm or any of its partners to acquiesce in a client’s fraud
38
because they had little to gain and much to lose by doing so. Few
now accept his observation, and recent events make clear that, at least
during the 1990s, many accountants were prepared to overlook their
clients’ financial frauds or to acquiesce in them.39 Of course,
acquiescence—and even assistance—is considerably more likely when
the client is engaged not in fraud but in manipulating GAAP so as to
produce some desired level of earnings or to influence some given
balance sheet account.40
Much of the problem relates to the reward structure within
public accounting firms. There is a good bit of evidence that public
accounting firms, especially when they were providing multiple
37. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j–1(k) (adding section 10A(k) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
Professor Jim Cox argues that promoting a meaningful dialogue between accounting
professionals and audit committees should be a “core consideration” for the PCAOB. James D.
Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics for Accounting
Measurement, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 327 (2003).
38. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990).
39. See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text; see also AUSA Life v. Ernst & Young,
206 F.3d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 2000) (commenting on the “spinelessness” of the Ernst & Young
partner in charge of the audit in question).
40. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into
Securities Regulation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 209 (2000) (noting that the “predominant problem
is that of clients inducing their auditors to accept an inappropriate treatment of a financial
reporting issue” and that studies find an auditor is more likely to “cave in” when dealing with a
large client). Moreover, the earnings management problem persists. A financial analyst recently
adjusted the reported earnings of all companies in the S&P 500 to reflect what he viewed as (i)
questionable special charges, (ii) the cost of stock option grants, and (iii) overly rosy
assumptions relating to their pension plans. He found that, on average, in 1991 adjusted
earnings were 18 percent less than those the companies reported, while in 2002 they were 41
percent less. See Gretchen Morgenson, Earnings Are Worse Without the Icing, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2003, at C1.
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services to audit clients, tended to name as senior engagement
partners accountants who had demonstrated good sales skills or the
ability to “manage” relationships with clients. Such accountants,
however, are likely to be more flexible when interpreting accounting
and auditing standards than are skilled accounting technicians. As
former SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth testified:
Audit account partners are expected by their firms to establish close
relationships with the managements they serve. They are expected
to cross-market to management as full a range of non-audit services
as possible. And, they are compensated by their firms on the basis,
among others, of how much revenue they produce from their audit
clients. Their stake in maximizing revenue from these clients . . . is as
natural and compelling as any financial reward could be. To claim
these incentives have no adverse impact on both the fact and
41
appearance of independence is a fiction, pure and simple.

The role of salesperson is fundamentally inconsistent with that of
auditor, whose “ultimate allegiance [is] to the corporation’s creditors
42
and stockholders, as well as to the investing public.” Partners in
accounting firms, if compensated primarily on the basis of the volume
of services they sell, are unlikely to question rigorously dubious
accounting judgments made by audit clients, when to do so may
jeopardize the potential sale of audit and other services to those
clients. It is far more likely that the partner in charge of an
engagement, if she views an audit client primarily as a valued
customer, will seek to secure the good will of that “customer” by
acquiescing in all arguably reasonable accounting judgments it
makes—and even by using her expertise to help the audit client
understand how GAAP can be “gamed” to produce the financial
results the client wants to report. A sense of realism also suggests that
more junior members of accounting firms’ audit teams will be
reluctant to risk alienating these valued “customers” by challenging
their accounting judgments if they fear that by doing so they will
negatively affect their compensation or prospects for advancement.
Sarbanes-Oxley’s prohibition on auditing firms providing many
nonaudit services should help alleviate these problems, but it will not
eliminate them. The Act clearly assumes both that public companies
will continue to hire—and have the power to fire—their public
41. Hearings, supra note 27, at 7 (statement of Bevis Longstreth, former Commissioner of
Securities and Exchange Commission).
42. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).
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accountants, and that those firms will remain free to provide certain
43
nonaudit services. Moreover, even if one assumes that registered
public accounting firms will only provide audit clients with audit
services, the nature of the auditor-auditee relationship is such that
those firms and their partners will continue to find their
independence threatened by “pressures and other factors that [may]
impair [their] objectivity.”44 Furthermore, although Sarbanes-Oxley
will reduce the pressures that accountants must have felt when their
firms were generating most of their profits from the provision of
nonaudit services,45 if audit services now become profit centers for
large public accounting firms (as knowledgeable observers predict
will be the case), the pressures on objectivity arising from the auditorauditee relationship may well become more intense.
How, then, should the PCAOB address the problem of auditor
independence? It should begin by abandoning the notion—now
implicit in the accounting profession’s ethical standards and rules on
independence—that it is appropriate to view each accounting firm as
a “black box” that can and should be regulated as an entity. For at
least two decades, students of the public corporation have recognized
that this is not the case, and have devoted most of their efforts to
46
addressing principal-agent tensions that exist within the firm. The
43. Most worrisome may be tax counseling services. Accounting firms that provide such
services generally will act as advocates for their clients vis-à-vis the Internal Revenue Service. In
addition, they will be required to verify the validity of their clients’ accruals for tax liabilities,
and thus the validity of their tax advice, when auditing those clients’ books.
44. See William T. Allen & Arthur Siegel, Threats and Safeguards in the Determination of
Auditor Independence, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 519, 528 (2002) (quoting INDEPENDENCE
STANDARDS BD., STAFF REPORT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR AUDITOR
INDEPENDENCE (2001), at http://www.cpaindependence.org, and listing five “sources of threats
to objectivity,” all of which are present in the standard auditor-auditee relationship); see also
Cox, supra note 37, at 315 (“[A] good deal of the auditor’s independence is compromised by the
sheer magnitude of the audit fees associated with a client, especially if they view these fees as a
perpetuity.”); Sean M. O’Connor, The Inevitability of Enron and the Impossibility of “Auditor
Independence” Under the Current Audit System 2–3, at http://papers.ssrn.com/toptens/
tt_jrnl_296306.html (University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Working Paper, 2002) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (making a similar argument).
45. See John C. Coffee, The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor
Independence and Governance of Accounting 14–16 (Columbia Law School, Center for Law and
Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 191, 2001), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/
law-economicstudies/papers/wp191.pdf (performing a seminal analysis of these pressures); see
also Richard M. Frankel et al., The Relation Between Auditors’ Fees for Nonaudit Services and
Earnings Management, 77 ACCT. REV., 71 (Supp. 2002) (finding “a positive association between
nonaudit fees and the likelihood of reporting a small earnings surprise”).
46. See Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (1976) (setting forth agency
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accounting profession’s rules and standards relating to auditor
independence have, however, continued to view accounting firms as
“black boxes” and have focused almost exclusively on regulating
conflicts of interest between those firms, their partners and
47
employees, on the one hand, and audit clients on the other.
The Board should recognize that the incentives firms provide,
whether monetary or nonmonetary, undoubtedly exert as strong an
influence on the partners and employees of accounting firms as they
do on the executives and employees of public corporations.
Consequently, the Board should revise GAAS and the accounting
profession’s ethical standards and rules on independence to reflect
this reality. More specifically, the Board should require registered
public accounting firms to adopt incentive systems that promote,
rather than threaten, the independent performance by audit partners
48
and employees of their public responsibilities.
Section 501 of Sarbanes-Oxley, which addresses conflicts of
interest involving securities analysts, suggests one approach the
49
PCAOB should consider. That section instructs the SEC or the
National Association of Securities Dealers to adopt rules designed
to establish structural and institutional safeguards within registered
brokers or dealers to assure that securities analysts are separated by
appropriate informational partitions within the firm from the
review, pressure, or oversight of those whose involvement in
investment banking activities might potentially bias their judgment
50
or supervision.

As such, section 501 reflects Congress’s recognition that regulating
broker-dealer firms’ incentive structures is necessary to safeguard the
independence of securities analysts, another group of professionals

cost theory of the firm); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Symposium on Organization and Economics, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 15, 15–19 (1991) (reviewing shift in economic analysis from viewing the firm as a
“black box” to considering carefully what occurs within the firm).
47. See 1–1 Applying GAAP and GAAS Section 1.09, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
CONSIDERATIONS IN ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENGAGEMENTS (Matthew Bender 2004)
(listing AICPA Rules of Professional Conduct and Interpretations of those rules, which focus
heavily on regulating specific relationships between the firm, its employees, and audit clients).
48. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 103, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213 (West Supp. 2003) (clearly
authorizing the Board to adopt such standards).
49. Section 501 also suggests that an initiative along the lines suggested would be entirely
consistent with congressional intent. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o–6.
50. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o–6(a)(3) (adding section 15D(a)(3) to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934).
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charged with acting in the interest of investors. The PCAOB could
similarly require that registered public accounting firms establish
structural and institutional safeguards designed to ensure that they do
not provide their partners or employees with incentives or subject
their partners or employees to pressures—financial or nonfinancial—
that are likely to jeopardize their independent performance of their
responsibilities.
In a more affirmative vein, the PCAOB also should consider the
regulatory implications of Professor Robert Prentice’s observation
that public accounting firms generally do not appropriately reward
51
partners and employees for astute and rigorous auditing. That might
lead the Board to consider issuing rules or standards that would
require registered public accounting firms to adopt structural and
institutional policies directed at rewarding, and thus encouraging,
high-quality auditor performance.52
II. ACCURACY
A large part of the impetus for Sarbanes-Oxley’s passage derived
from public and congressional concern about widespread
53
“management” of public companies’ earnings. This form of data
manipulation results when managers intentionally make accounting
judgments and assumptions with a view to enabling their firms to
report some given level of earnings—most frequently, earnings that
meet or narrowly exceed investors’ expectations.54 Every person with
51. Prentice, supra note 40, at 195–98.
52. For example, the PCAOB might encourage accounting firms to adopt policies that
provide bonuses or accelerated promotion to auditors who detect fraud or persuade clients to
modify questionable accounting estimates. Precisely how the PCAOB should frame its rules in
this area best awaits discussion between the Board and appropriate expert advisory groups.
Section 103(a)(4) of the Act anticipates that the Board often will find it desirable to consult with
such groups before promulgating new rules and standards. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213(a)(4). Whatever
form any such rules take, the PCAOB then will be in a position to ensure at least a reasonable
level of compliance by exercising its authority to conduct inspections of registered public
accounting firms and to discipline firms that fail to meet regulatory requirements. See SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 §§ 104–105, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7214–7215.
53. See Matthew S. Mokwa, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the End of Earnings Management,
39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 325, 348–49 (citing earnings management as a primary culprit behind the
frauds the Act was designed to prevent).
54. Note 18, supra, discusses the issues involved in defining “earnings management.”
However, Professors David Burgstahler and Ilia Dichev provide compelling statistical evidence
that earnings are in some sense “managed.” See David Burgstahler & Ilia Dichev, Earnings
Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses, 24 J. ACCT. & ECON. 99, 99–101 (1997).
In a random sample, one would expect roughly equal numbers of firms to report earnings just
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a reasonable grasp of financial accounting knows that financial
statements prepared in accordance with GAAP may or may not be
objectively accurate because they always reflect a variety of subjective
judgments:
•

What portion of accounts receivable will a company be able to
collect?

•

What portion of the loans it has made will not be repaid?

•

What portion of goods sold subject to rights to return will in fact
be returned?

•

What costs will the company have to incur to meet warranty
obligations related to goods or services it has sold?

•

Have changes in consumer tastes or technology caused the fair
market value of items in inventory to drop below cost or the
value of fixed assets to drop below book value?

•

What actuarial assumptions and rates of return should the
company use to determine pension expenses and liabilities?

•

How much should the company accrue to reflect the income tax
it would have to pay if its taxable income was the same as its
GAAP income?

•

How much should it accrue to meet its obligations under various
environmental protection laws?

•

What costs will the company incur in closing down a line of
business it has decided to discontinue or integrating a business it
has agreed to acquire?

Most people familiar with financial accounting also realize that
managers’ subjective judgments have had a steadily increasing impact
on public companies’ financial statements in recent years. This is a
above and just below their previous year’s earnings. The authors found, however, that reported
earnings form “a striking, nonrandom pattern,” with very few firms falling just short of previous
year’s earnings and many more firms matching or barely exceeding previous year’s earnings. Id.
at 103–06. Their findings suggest one reason a company’s stock price often falls sharply when it
reports earnings just short of the market’s expectations: investors may interpret such results as
indicating not a minor shortfall, but that the company, even after taking advantage of all the
opportunities to manage earnings that GAAP provides, still could not hit its earnings target.
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consequence of two developments: the proliferation of complex
financial instruments that GAAP require be “marked to market,” and
the tendency of public companies to reorganize their operations with
increasing frequency, which generates a need to create reserves to
55
cover anticipated costs.
These developments create the potential for an increase in
“earnings management,” but the principal cause of problems in
this area, in my view, is the focus on market expectations. When
making the subjective judgments required by GAAP, managers of
public companies have increasingly disregarded the objective of
generating as accurate a picture as possible of the results of their
companies’ operations. Instead, the goal has moved toward
structuring these results such that their companies can report
whatever level of earnings the managers themselves have led
56
investors—i.e., the market—to expect. Moreover, the problem
probably has been exacerbated by the willingness of at least some
accountants to advise audit clients about how they can “game the
system”—i.e., how they can report the earnings they wish to report

55. As concerns accounting for derivatives, Warren Buffett recently observed:
Errors will usually be honest, reflecting only the human tendency to take an
optimistic view of one’s commitments. But the parties to derivatives also have
enormous incentives to cheat in accounting for them. Those who trade derivatives are
usually paid (in whole or in part) on “earnings” calculated by mark-to-market
accounting. But often there is no real market . . . and “mark-to-model” is utilized.
This substitution can bring on large-scale mischief. . . . In extreme cases, mark-tomodel degenerates into what I would call mark-to-myth.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2003).
56. Warren Buffett noted some time ago that “many managements view GAAP not as a
standard to be met, but as an obstacle to be overcome. Too often their accountants assist
them. . . . Even honest and well-intentioned managements sometimes stretch GAAP a bit . . . .”
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 1988 SHAREHOLDER LETTER 2–3 (1988). More recently—but
well in advance of the accounting scandals brought to light in the early 2000s—he observed that
corporate norms had shifted to the point where “stretch[ing] GAAP a bit” had become a
pervasive problem:
What bothers me . . . is that people of generally high integrity who you would trust in
any situation—you could make them the trustee under your will—but it has now
become the norm to feel that as the manager of a major company it is up to [them] to
play the accounting game, particularly the ones suggested to [them] by [their] very
own auditor.
It is the degree to which the high grade people have either been co-opted or
acquiesced or whatever word you want to pick. And that’s very tough to cleanse the
system of because you don’t have good guys and bad guys anymore.
Conversations from the Warren Buffett Symposium, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 799 (1997)
(quoting Warren E. Buffett).
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by making accounting judgments that the auditors have indicated
57
they will be prepared to accept.
Some have suggested that the best approach to the problem of
earnings management would be to revise GAAP so as to make them
58
less rule-based and more principled. That approach may have some
merit, but given the complexity and unpredictability of business,
subjective judgments by corporate managers will continue to play a
major role in the preparation of public companies’ financial
statements no matter how principle-based GAAP become.59 Thus, to
improve the accuracy of public companies’ financial statements by
reducing earnings management (and fraud), the PCAOB should
instead consider amending GAAS to require registered accounting
firms to do a better job of identifying the companies most likely to
engage in earnings management (and fraud), to question vigorously
all important accounting judgments and estimates made by the
managers of those companies, and to bring to the attention of the
audit committees of client companies any estimates or judgments
about which the accountants continue to be concerned.60
It is my understanding that every large public accounting firm
already has in place systems that can identify higher risk audit clients.
What is unclear to me, though, is whether those firms’ risk assessment
systems take adequate account of factors that recent events suggest
often are associated with aggressive earnings management (and
sometimes are associated with fraud). Those factors include
•

Large amounts of stock options (or other incentive
compensation arrangements) that have—or are likely to have—

57. As noted in the above discussion of independence issues, see supra notes 41–42 and
accompanying text, accounting firms’ incentive structures may well encourage audit partners to
engage in such behavior.
58. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 27, at 12 (statement of Robert E. Litan, Director,
Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institute).
59. Professor Cox points out that a principle-based system invites more discretion and
judgment, by both reporting companies and their auditors, and thus may exacerbate problems in
this area. Cox, supra note 37, at 315.
60. The Panel on Audit Effectiveness made a similar general recommendation, directed
primarily at the detection of fraud. See PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 87, at http://www.pobauditpanel.org (Aug. 31, 2000) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal). Their focus, however, is on strengthening what might best be termed
“traditional” audit procedures. Id. at 87–92. Of course, requiring registered public accounting
firms to change their incentive structures, see supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text, also
should make it less likely that auditors will help the managers of audit clients to figure out
“acceptable” techniques for “managing” their companies’ earnings.
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value only so long as the company reports steadily increasing
61
revenues or earnings;
•

Earnings “guidance” or estimates that appear aggressive when
considered in light of the line(s) of business in which a company
is engaged;

•

A history of reporting smooth and steady earnings growth when
the company’s primary line(s) of business tend to be volatile or
cyclical; and

•

An audit committee that lacks independence or, perhaps more
importantly, that appears to have little interest in understanding
the important accounting issues the company faces or in
reviewing the important accounting judgments embedded in its
62
financial reports.

There is an early step the PCAOB could take to address
concerns about earnings management and to improve the accuracy of
public companies’ financial reports. It would entail amending GAAS
to require registered public accounting firms to incorporate these and
63
similar risk factors into their risk assessment matrices.
Another step the Board should consider would be revising
GAAS to require accounting firms, especially when auditing higher
61. A related factor may be what portion of managers’ compensation is fixed and what
portion is dependent on either the price of the company’s stock or reported financial results
(which usually will affect the price of its stock). By 1999, chief executives were receiving some
60 percent of their annual pay in stock and options. Daniel Altman, How to Tie Pay to Goals,
Instead of the Stock Price, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2002, at C4.
62. This listing is meant to be illustrative, not comprehensive. Although the risk factors
listed are suggested by recent events, it is worth noting that the Treadway Report, issued in
1987, suggested that auditors take account of similar factors in considering the risk of fraudulent
financial reporting. NAT’L COMM’N ON FRAUDULENT FIN. REPORTING, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 155–64 (1987), available at
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/hackenbrack/acg5637/PDF/NCFFR.pdf (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (commonly known as the Treadway Report).
63. The auditing standard currently directed at audit risk, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS NO. 47; AUDIT RISK AND
MATERIALITY IN CONDUCTING AN AUDIT (1983) [hereinafter SAS NO. 47], focuses much more
heavily on the risks associated with an auditor not sampling sufficient transactions to detect
material discrepancies. SAS No. 47 does not effectively address the risk that the managers of
firms with certain characteristics are more likely to make accounting judgments directed at
achieving some desired level of reported earnings. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS NO. 82; CONSIDERATION OF FRAUD
IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT (1997) [hereinafter SAS NO. 82], does require auditors to
consider similar factors, but only in relation to risks associated with “cooking the books.”
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risk clients, to obtain a reasonable understanding of the dynamics of
those clients’ businesses, including an understanding of external
economic factors likely to have a significant impact on earnings. The
results of a study Janet Moser and I conducted of the accounting
64
fraud allegedly perpetrated by Green Tree Financial Corporation.
suggest that had Green Tree’s auditors focused on external data that
made clear dramatic changes had occurred in the economic and
competitive environment in which Green Tree was operating, they
would—or at least should—have realized the need to question the
key assumptions underlying Green Tree’s reports that its earnings
were steadily increasing.65
Similarly, three accounting professors recently studied the audit
failure at Lincoln Savings and Loan and concluded that
consideration of readily available data about the Phoenix real estate
market should have led Lincoln’s auditors to question the profits
Lincoln reported on several fraudulent real estate transactions.66
The authors note that SAS No. 82, which is directed at increasing
auditors’ sensitivity to the possibility of fraud, does not require
auditors to consider such external data.67 Absent such a
requirement, the authors argue, auditors following traditional
procedures often fail to question fraudulent transactions similar to
those in which Lincoln was involved.68

64. The alleged fraud is described in Florida State Board of Administration v. Green Tree
Financial Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 648–51 (8th Cir. 2001) (reversing decision dismissing complaint
alleging Green Tree and various insiders violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
65. See Elliott Weiss & Janet Moser, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural
Catch-22 that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457, 481–97
(1998). Green Tree used “gain on sale” accounting to record profits from its securitization and
resale of subprime mortgages secured by liens on manufactured housing. A key component in
Green Tree’s calculation of its gains on such resales was its estimate of the rate at which those
mortgages would be prepaid. Id. at 475–78. Increased competition in the subprime lending
business and declining interest rates made it highly likely that prepayments would accelerate,
which would reduce the gains Green Tree realized on the resales of those mortgages. Id. at 481–
92. Notably, Green Tree also involved a risk factor of the kind discussed earlier. See supra notes
61–62 and accompanying text. Its CEO was employed under a contract with a unique and
potentially very lucrative bonus arrangement, keyed to Green Tree’s reported earnings, that
expired at the end of Fiscal Year 1996. Weiss & Moser, supra, at 492–93; see also Green Tree,
270 F.3d at 661 (holding that Green Tree’s bonus arrangement provided its CEO with the
motive to misreport earnings).
66. Merle Erickson et al., Why Do Audits Fail? Evidence from Lincoln Savings and Loan,
38 J. ACCT. RES. 165, 168 (2000).
67. Id. at 191–92.
68. Id. at 192.
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Turning to more recent events, consideration of relevant industry
data might well have led auditors to question more vigorously how
certain companies accounted for various transactions that have been
much in the news. For example, had Global Crossing’s or Qwest’s
69
auditors been required to consider data on industry trends, they
probably would have become aware of the growing glut in fiber optics
70
cable capacity; thus, they would have been better positioned to
question whether it was appropriate for those companies to recognize
current revenues from transactions in which they simply swapped
excess cable capacity with other, similarly burdened, fiber optics
companies.71 In like fashion, had Arthur Andersen been required to
consider relevant external data, it might have examined more closely
Enron’s claim that it realized a $110.9 million gain on its sale to a
purportedly independent special purpose entity of its interest in a
joint venture with Blockbuster Inc.—a venture that had only recently
been created, had virtually no customers, and had not even
negotiated arrangements with any of the major movie studios that
were the only possible sources for the motion pictures that were to be
the venture’s principal product.72
Of course, requiring that registered accounting firms pay
attention to a broader range of risk factors and consider relevant
external data will not guarantee that those firms will ask the right
73
questions about suspicious estimates and transactions. To make it
more likely that they will, a third step is required—one that clearly is

69. See Dennis K. Berman, House Panel Issues Subpoenas to Global, Qwest Executives,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002, at B4 (“Both companies face myriad investigations into whether
their swaps of hundreds of millions of dollars of telecom capacity were used to inflate
revenue.”).
70. See Henny Sender & Dennis K. Berman, SEC Rules Against Capacity Swaps, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 21, 2002, at B3 (characterizing the telecommunications sector as an industry “grappling
with a massive glut of capacity”).
71. See Dennis K. Berman & Deborah Solomon, Optical Illusion? Accounting Questions
Swirl Around Pioneer in the Telecom World, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at A1 (describing use of
“swaps” by Global Crossing and Qwest); Global Crossing Discussed Using Swaps with Qwest,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2002, at B3 (reporting on emails showing “that executives at both
companies used the [swap] deals as a way of bolstering their revenue figures and making the
companies’ growth prospects look better than they actually were”).
72. See Rebecca Smith, Show Business: A Blockbuster Deal Shows How Enron Overplayed
Its Hand, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2002, at A1.
73. See, e.g., In the Matter of Arthur Andersen LLP, Securities Exchange Release No.
44,444 (June 19, 2001) (describing how Arthur Andersen identified Waste Management, Inc. as
a high risk audit client but then allowed Waste Management to continue to engage in
accounting practices that Andersen knew were improper).
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within the PCAOB’s authority and should be within its capacity.
Recall that Sarbanes-Oxley requires the PCAOB to conduct annual
74
or triennial inspections of registered public accounting firms. When
it does, the Board, through its staff, should review whether each firm
being inspected is complying with whatever new auditing standards
the Board promulgates in these areas. As concerns situations where
risk factors were present or where external data gave rise to
suspicions about the validity of otherwise seemingly legitimate
transactions or estimates, the Board should review whether the
auditors questioned those transactions or estimates with appropriate
vigor. The Board should not find it unduly burdensome to determine
whether the appropriate inquiries were made; they can do so by
examining the auditors’ work papers, which should record all such
inquiries if they were made.
The prospect of such inspections, in turn, is likely to lead to a
reasonably high degree of auditor compliance with whatever new
auditing standards the Board adopts. Registered accounting firms,
their partners, and their employees will all be on notice of the
possibility that the Board will review their work on any given audit—
and of the even greater likelihood that the Board will focus its review
on audits that, with the benefit of hindsight, appear problematic. The
firms also will appreciate the possibility that disciplinary action will
result if the Board finds that an audit was conducted negligently or
recklessly. A decrease in earnings management and fraud and an
increase in the accuracy of public companies’ financial reports should
result.
III. TRANSPARENCY
Even if accuracy improves and earnings management is reduced,
issues relating to the transparency of public companies’ financial
75
reports will persist. At the end of the day, accountants have no real
choice but to accept accounting estimates and assumptions that the
managers of audit clients insist are reasonable and for which those

74. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 104, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7214 (West Supp. 2003).
75. In a recent paper, Professors Healy and Palepu argue that a priority for corporate audit
committees should be to “focus on the broader issue of transparency.” Paul M. Healy & Krisha
Palepu, Governance and Intermediation Problems in Capital Markets: Evidence from the Fall of
Enron 39 (Harvard Business School, Negotiations, Organizations, and Markets Unit, Research
Paper No. 02–27, 2002). It seems to me that public companies’ auditors are better situated than
their audit committees to understand and address transparency issues.
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managers can offer cogent justifications. Moreover, this is as it should
be; a company’s managers, if acting honestly, will almost always be
better positioned than its auditors to assess how potential future
developments are likely to affect that company’s business.
The transparency problem, in a nutshell, derives from the
statement in the standard auditor’s opinion that the reporting
company’s financial statements “present fairly . . . in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles” the company’s financial
position as of a given date and the results of its operations for a given
period. That statement leaves a great deal unsaid. Even financially
sophisticated readers of most companies’ financial statements often
find it somewhere between difficult and impossible to ascertain, first,
what critical accounting estimates, assumptions, and judgments the
reporting company’s managers have made (and its auditors have
accepted) and, second, how sensitive the company’s reported results
and financial position are to those estimates, assumptions, and
76
judgments.
Sarbanes-Oxley section 204 reflects an awareness of this issue
through its requirement that every registered public accounting firm
report to the audit committee of every audit client about the client
company’s “critical accounting policies and practices” and “all
alternative treatments of financial information” it has discussed with
77
that company’s management. But Sarbanes-Oxley does not require
the audit committee to express publicly its opinion about the
reasonableness of the choices management has made and, as is
pointed out above, the SEC’s efforts to require managers to do so in
their companies’ MD&A to date have borne very little fruit.78

76. In Release No. 8040 the SEC states:
Reported financial position and results often imply a degree of precision, continuity
and certainty that can be belied by rapid changes in the financial and operating
environment that produced those measures. As a result, even a technically accurate
application of generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) may nonetheless
fail to communicate important information if it is not accompanied by appropriate
and clear analytic disclosures to facilitate an investor’s understanding of the
company’s financial status, and the possibility, likelihood and implication of changes
in the financial and operating status.
Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical Accounting Policies, Securities Act
Release No. 8404, Exchange Act Release No. 45,149, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,013 (Dec. 17, 2001).
77. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j–1(k); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (pointing out that even though the SEC
has begun pressing public companies to disclose more about their critical accounting judgments,
very few companies have responded satisfactorily to the SEC’s efforts).
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The PCAOB is well situated—perhaps more so than the SEC—
to make a constructive contribution here. It could do so by amending
GAAS to make two changes in the standard auditors’ opinion. First,
it could require the standard opinion to include the phrase “as
explained in the attached statement” just before the “present fairly”
statement. Second, it could require that the firm rendering that
opinion also prepare what might be called a Presents Fairly
Explanation (PFE). Therein, the audit firm would (1) identify what in
its view are the most critical accounting judgments management had
made, (2) describe the factors the auditors took into account when
reviewing those judgments, and (3) discuss the sensitivity of the
reporting company’s balance sheet or income statement to those
judgments.79
To illustrate, assume a situation in which a large portion of
Bank’s loans outstanding are mortgages on homes in the area in
which Bank operates. Real estate prices in that area have recently
begun to soften, the local economy is not growing, and
80
delinquencies in mortgage payments have begun to inch up. Bank’s
managers assert that Bank’s allowance for bad debts should be 2
percent of loans outstanding, which is in line with Banks’ experience
for the past five years. The auditors point out that, in light of the
developments noted above, a higher allowance might be
appropriate, especially because each 0.5 percent increase in Bank’s
allowance for bad debts would reduce its reported earnings by 6
percent. Management responds that it does not believe any increase
is necessary because, in anticipation of a likely economic downturn,
Bank recently tightened its mortgage lending standards.
Consequently, management does not believe any significant increase
in defaults by Bank’s borrowers is likely.

79. The standard I have in mind would go well beyond Statement on Standards of
Attestation Engagements No. 8 (SSAE No. 8), which sets forth the current obligations of an
accountant retained to review a client company’s MD&A. See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON STANDARDS OF ATTESTATION ENGAGEMENTS NO. 8;
MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS (1998). SSAE No. 8 largely limits the
accountant’s obligations to making sure that the client (a) has satisfied the minimum
requirements set forth in SEC rules and (b) has computed correctly its comparison of year-toyear differences. Id. § 700.05. The requirement that the accountant also review management’s
estimates and assumptions adds little because those estimates and assumptions are likely to be
identical to the estimates and assumptions the accountant reviewed when auditing the
company’s financial statements.
80. A situation similar to that allegedly involved in Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964
F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992). See id. at 275–76.
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In these circumstances, the auditors probably have no choice but
to demur to the judgment of Bank’s managers. However, if the
auditors, in their professional judgment, identify Bank’s allowance for
bad debts as reflecting a critical accounting judgment likely to have a
significant impact on Bank’s financial statements, they then might
include in their PFE a statement along the following lines:
One critical accounting judgment made by Bank’s management
concerns the size of Bank’s allowance for bad debts, which
management has set at 2 percent of loans outstanding. Each 0.5
percent increase (or decrease) in that allowance would have caused
Bank’s reported earnings for the most recent year to decrease (or
increase) by 6 percent. We have discussed with management the
factors that, in our opinion, could make an increase in defaults on
mortgage loan repayments more likely. Management has assured us
that it has considered those factors and that, in light of Bank’s
lending policies, management believes the 2 percent allowance,
which also is consistent with Bank’s recent experience, is
81
reasonable.

It would be both reasonable and desirable for the PCAOB to
require registered public accounting firms—which, after all, are
comprised of professionals who possess a great deal of specialized
expertise—to include PFEs in the reports they issue on public
companies’ financial statements. Such explanatory statements have
the potential to enhance considerably investors’ and other users’
qualitative appreciation of the quantitative information included in
82
financial statements. Moreover, an effort by the PCAOB along these
lines is more likely to succeed in promoting disclosure of meaningful
explanatory information about financial statements than have the
MD&A-related efforts of the SEC, because the PCAOB—through its
periodic inspection of accounting firms and review of their work
papers—will be in a better position than the SEC to determine what
81. The PCAOB could either provide auditing firms with a benchmark as to what
constitutes a “critical accounting judgment” or could leave that determination to those firms’
professional judgment. Were it to adopt the former approach, it might establish as a benchmark
that a judgment presumptively is critical if reported income would increase or decrease by at
least 5 percent were the judgment to vary by an amount that the auditors considered to be
within the range of reasonable possibilities.
82. In a comment on this Article, Professor Jim Cox suggested that if large public
accounting firms are genuinely concerned about the inherent limitations of the accounting
process, as their recent public comments suggest, they might welcome a requirement that they
explain those limitations in a PFE. Professor Jim Cox, Speech at the Duke Law Journal/ILEP
Conference on Complex Litigation (Apr. 5, 2003).
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accounting issues have been discussed by accounting firms with their
audit clients and to make sure that they have also addressed the most
83
important issues in their PFEs.
However, the PCAOB also should recognize that registered
accounting firms have legitimate grounds to be concerned that
requiring them to prepare PFEs will increase dramatically their
exposure to liability, especially when situations arise (as they
inevitably will) in which an accounting firm fails to discuss in a PFE
some important accounting judgment, assumption, or estimate an
84
audit client made that later proves to be inaccurate. The PCAOB
might best respond to this concern by conditioning any requirement
that auditors prepare PFEs on the adoption by the SEC of a rule that
brings the PFE within the existing statutory safe harbor for forward85
looking statements.
CONCLUSION
After a rocky start, caused by a flawed appointment process, the
PCAOB is now up and running. The SEC has approved its
86
organizational structure and has appointed a highly qualified person
to serve as its permanent chairman.87 The Board itself has begun
hiring staff and, perhaps most importantly, has decided to assume the
83. Here, too, accounting firms’ awareness that they will be inspected should lead to
increased compliance. In addition, requiring accountants to prepare a PFE may give them
welcome additional leverage in negotiating with clients about accounting estimates that they
believe may be unsound. A public company that knows its accountants plan to discuss an issue
in their PFE may be willing to modify estimates its accountants question if by doing so it can
avoid having the accountants issue a PFE that makes those estimates the focus of investors’
attention.
84. The danger here, as in other areas of securities law, is that the auditors will be
vulnerable to charges of “fraud by hindsight.” See Elliott J. Weiss, Pleading Securities Fraud, 64
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6–7, 48–52 (Spring/Summer 2001) (discussing the ease with which
a skilled plaintiffs’ attorney, benefiting from hindsight, can frame a seemingly convincing charge
of fraud).
85. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 77u–5 (2000). Although one
could argue that the statutory safe harbor does not include “a forward-looking statement . . .
that is . . . included in a financial statement prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles,” id. § 21E(b)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77u–5(b)(2)(A), the PCAOB and the
SEC might be able to finesse this issue by defining the PFE as a document that supplements, but
is not “included in,” the financial statement to which it relates.
86. See Deborah Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Questioning the Books: Accounting
Board to Give Chairman Additional Power, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2003, at C7 (reporting that the
SEC formally signed off on the PCAOB).
87. See McDonough to Head, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2003, at C9 (stating that the SEC
approved the appointment of William McDonough to head the PCAOB).
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responsibility, previously exercised by the AICPA, of establishing
professional auditing standards.
Much remains to be done, and it no doubt will take considerable
time before the PCAOB becomes a fully effective regulator of the
firms that audit public companies’ financial reports. However,
Congress appears to have given the Board the powers it needs to do
that job and created an organizational structure that will allow the
88
Board to operate with considerable autonomy. In this Article, I
make some suggestions about how, once the PCAOB begins to
consider new auditing standards, it might use its rulemaking authority
to improve the integrity, accuracy, and transparency of the financial
reporting process. Perhaps the Board will find them to be of interest.

88. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211 (West Supp. 2003)
(providing that the SEC, an independent regulatory agency, shall appoint the members of the
Board); id. § 107, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217 (charging the SEC with responsibility for overseeing the
activities of the Board); id. § 109, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7219 (authorizing the Board to assess auditing
firms and public companies annual fees to support the Board’s activities).

